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HOW NECESSARY IS THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE?
GERALD HARWOOD·

Having administrative law judges preside in administrative cases
affecting individual rights and liabilities is being criticized today as
an outmoded procedure except in "accusatory" cases where a person
is charged with wrongdoing. The purpose of this article is to examine
the arguments behind this criticism and to demonstrate that the al
iemative procedures which are proposed, contrary to the claims
made for them, are not likely to improve the quality of decision
making, and can, in fact, destroy the effectiveness of the procedure
by undermining public confidence in it.
I.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

The administrative law judge is an employee of the agency over
whose heatings he presides. He is, however, largely independent of
'
the agency. His pay is fixed by the Office of Personnel Management;2
he can be removed only for good cause established and determined
by the Merit Systems Protection Board after a hearing;3 and his per
formance cannot be rated by the agency.4 In addition, his impartial
ity is assured by a rigorous "separation of functions" which
insulates him from any supervision or direction by agency employ
ees who have taken part in the investigation or prosecution of the
case being heard, and which also prohibits him from consulting ex
plUte with any person on any fact in issue. S The administrative law
judge, however, is not the final decisionmaker. He plays only an in
• Administrative Law Judge, Environmental Protection Agency, since 1976. B.A.,
Yale University, 1942; LL.B., Harvard Law Scllool, 1948.
This article was written by the author in his private capacity. No official support or
endorsement by. the United States Environmental Prote<:tion Agency is intended or
should be inferred.
I. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). On occasion, when an agency finds itself understaffed
with admjnjstrative law judges, it may temporarily borrow a judge selected by the Office
of Personnel Management from another agency. 5 U.S.C. § 3344 (1982).
2. Id § 5362.
3. Id § 7521.
4. Id II 4302, 4303.
5. Id § 554(d).
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termediate role. It is the agency which is the final decisionmaker and
it has broad discretion in overruling the administrative law judge.6
II.

AOMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS

The use of independent hearing officials stems from the due
process requirement that an agency must afford a person a hearing
before it takes action affecting that person's liberty or property.' It
was a response to the concern that agency employees, advocating a
particular agency action against a claimant who disputed the propri
ety of the action, should not also act as the judge of that dispute. The
final solution was a compromise between those who thought that
there should be a complete separation between agencies that prose
cute and agencies that decide, and those who feared that separating
those who make policy from those who determine disputes regarding
its application would frustrate the agency's ability to put its policies
into effect. s Under the compromise embodied in the Administrative
Procedure Act, a distinction is made between rulemaking and adju
dication with different minimum procedural requirements for each.
In rulemaking, an independent hearing officer and the concomi
tant separation of functions is not required unless a regulatory stat
ute specifically provides otherwise. This is true because rulemaking
is regarded essentially as setting policy to govern future conduct. 9
Adjudication, on the other hand, consists of those cases which
terminate in the issuance of an order against a specific party; "order"
being defined to include the grant, modification, or denial of a li
6. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489-97 (1951); and FCC v.
Allentown Broadcasting Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1955) (rejecting the "clearlyerrone
ous" standard for agency review of administrative law judge's decisions). See 5 U.S.C.
§ 557(b) (1982), "[o)n appeal from or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the
powers which it would have in making the initial decision except as it may limit the
issues on notice or by rule," and AnORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRA
TIVE PROCEDURE ACT 83 (1947) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL). In some recent statutes,
review more closely approximates the clearly erroneous standard. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C
§ 820 (1982), providing that initial decisions reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission shall be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. As
suming that this is the same standard that is followed by the appellate courts in reviewing
administrative decisions, the MSHRC would have to give an initial decision the same
weight that a district court would have to give a jury verdict. See Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).
7. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. I, 14-15 (1938).
8. See Davis, Separation of Functions in Administrati"e Agencies, 61 HARV. L. REv.
389 (1948); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 37 (1950); Butz v. Economu, 438
U.S. 478, 513-14 (1978).
9. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982); MANUAL, supra note 6, at 14.
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cense or permit. \0 In such cases, the separation of functions require
ment does not apply if the agency or one of its members presides
over the adjudication. This is in recognition of the fact that the
agency is to be the final arbiter of both policy and its application to
specific cases. I I As a practical matter, however, the sheer volume of
cases generally precludes the agency or one of its members presiding
over these cases. If the agency or one of its members does not pre
side, the presiding officer must be an administrative law judge (who
originally had the title of "hearing examiner") and, except in appli
cations for "initial licensing," the separation of functions require
ment also applies. 12 In initial licensing, the administrative law judge
presides over the conduct of the hearing but there is no separation of
functions and the intermediate decision (initial or recommended)
can be rendered by any responsible agency employee. 13 The reason
for treating initial licensing in this fashion appears to have been that
while the rights of individuals are involved in initial licensing cases
as well as in other adjudications, initial licensing is also considered
to have some of the policymaking characteristics of rulemaking. 14
As to the hearings, themselves, rulemaking requires only notice
of the propc;>sed agency action and the opportunity to comment upon
it. IS There is no right to an oral hearing. 16 Adjudicative hearings, on
the other hand, are modeled after the traditional judicial procedures
for deciding controversiesP The party against whom the agency
proposes to take action must be given notice of the issues of law and
fact asserted to support the proposed agency action. IS The party has
the right to present its case by oral or documentary evidence, and to
conduct cross-examination. 19 The evidence is presented systemati
cally in accordance with established rules allocating the burden of
proof. 2O The decision rendered must not only be based upon the rec
ord, but the facts relied on must be supported by the evidence of
10. Sec: definition of "Adjudication" in 5 U.S.c. § 551 (1982).
11. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982); MANUAL, supra note 6, at 58.
12. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1982).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (1982).
14. Id; MANUAL, supra note 6, at 50-51.
15. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982).
16. See id Notice and comment can satisfy the statutory requirement for a hear
ing in an appropriate case even though the only participation allowed is the submission
of written views. United States v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
17. See id § 554.
18. Id § 556(b)(3).
19. Id § 556(d).
20. Id
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record,21 a requirement not necessarily present in rulemaking. 22 Fi
nally, of course, a hearing not presided over by the agency or one of
its members, must be presided over by an administrative law judge. 23
III.

THE FUNCTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

In presiding over adjudicative hearings, the first duty of the ad
ministrative law judge, and one certainly important to the mainte
nance of public confidence in the process, is to assure that the parties
are treated fairly and that rulings on requests and objections made
by the parties are even-handed and impartial. Second, and of equal
importance in those cas~s where the administrative law judge does
render a decision, is the duty to state his findings on all issues of law,
fact and discretion with supporting reasons. 24 There is value to both
the public and the agency in having the administrative law judge
preside over agency adjudications: The judge is free from any insti
tutional pressures influencing a particular result. This is most impor
tant, of course, in the finding of facts. On questions of policy, the
judge must follow agency policy as reflected in published agency rul
ings. Even with regard to questions of policy, however, there can be
conflicting policies to apply to a given set of facts, or questions may
be raised as to how a particular policy should be interpreted. The
administrative law judge can perform a useful service in sharpening
the policy issues for the agency's consideration in these cases. 2S
While the agency has broad discretion to overrule the adminis
trative law judge, ignoring his decision entirely may result in reversal
on judicial review. 26 The Supreme Court has stated that the adminis
trative law judge's findings should be given such weight as "in rea
son and in light of judicial experience they deserve."27 In practice,
this has meant that special weight has been given the administrative
law judge's credibility findings based upon his observation of the
21. See id §§ 556(d); 557(c); 706(2)(F). For the proposition that an agency is not
tied to the record in informal rulemaking see MANUAL, supra note 6, at 31-32. The
courts, however, have been reluctant to permit an agency to rely on factual material
which was not made part of the rulemaking record before the agency and available for
comment, although in a few instances they have allowed this. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of
Demolition Contractors v. Costle, 565 F.2d 748, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
22. See id § 553.
23. 5 U.S.C. § 556(b) (1982).
24. See 5 U.S.c. § 557(c) (1982).
25. See MANUAL, supra note 6, at 84.
26. ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1977).
27. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496-97 (1951).

NECESSITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE

1984J

797

witnesses. 28 Findings that are based on the inherent probative value
of testimony or documents and the inferences to be drawn from the
primary facts are generally entitled to less weight than the credibility
findings, but must still be considered and, where not followed, the
agency should either expressly give its reasons for its disagreement
with the administrative law judge, or the basis for the disagreement
should be apparent from the agency's decision. 29 On questions of
law or policy, the administrative law judge's conclusions probably
have little if any weight. Nevertheless, ventilation of the objections
and reasons for the policy or law being applied can expose flaws not
previously recognized, and it would be sound practice for the agency
to give careful thought to the administrative law judge's conclusions,
since a reviewing court may find the judge's reasoning persuasive. 30
In sum, the administrative law judge protects those who deal
with the agency from arbitrary or unwise action by providing the
agency and the reviewing court with an impartial assessment of the
merits of the objections made to the agency's action.

IV.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR DISPENSING WITH THE
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE IN "NON-AcCUSATORY"
CASES

As part of a broader attack upon the adjudicative proceeding as
a method for decisionmaking, Mr. William Pedersen and Professor
Davis have advocated dispensing with the use of administrative law
judges in certain proceedings on the grounds that many complex
technical issues which are now being decided by adjudication are
really policy or "legislative" issues. 31 To have such issues resolved by
procedures which require separation of functions and proof through
witnesses who are subject to cross-examination is thought to be un
duly time consuming, a waste of resources and generally not helpful
to the agency in reaching a final decision. 32
28. Id at 496-97.
29. Cindcrella Career &: Finishing Schools, Inc. v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583, 585-89
(D.C. Cir. 1970); NLRB v. Intcrboro Contractors Inc., 388 F.2d 495, 501 (2d Cir. 1967).
30. See Russell Stovcr Candies, Inc. v. FTC, Tradc Rcg. Rep. (CCH) [1983-2
Tradc CasesJ Par. 65,640 (8th Cir. 1983); ASG Indus., Inc. v. United States, 548 F.2d 147
(6th Cir. 1977).
31. 2 K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.7, 12.8 (2d ed. 1979); 3
K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 14.2 (2d ed. 1980); see generally Pedcr
sen. TIre Decline oj Separation of Functions in Regulatory Agencies. 64 VA. L. REv. 991
(1978).
32. 2 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at §§ 12.7, 12.8; 3 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at
§ 14.2; see Pedersen, supra note 31. at 1008-10.

798

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:793

To evaluate the arguments, two concepts must be considered:
First, the distinction between "legislative" and "adjudicative" facts;
and second, the distinction between "accusatory" and "non-accusa
tory" hearings.
"Adjudicative" facts are those facts which are peculiar to a par
ticular party while "legislative" facts are the background facts that
the agency considers in formulating policy. Professor Kenneth Culp
Davis, who originally framed the analysis, has cited Londoner v.
Denver,33 and Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board 0/ Equaliza
tion ,34 as illustrative of the difference between the two kinds of
facts. 3s The Supreme Court in United States v. Florida East Coast
Railway Co. ,36 used these two cases to distinguish between rulemak
ing and adjudication, but the Court's language also sheds light upon
what it would regard as adjudicative facts and what it would regard
as legislative facts:
The basic distinction between rulemaking and adjudication is il
lustrated by this Court's treatment of two related cases under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Londoner
v. Denver, . . . the Court held that due process had not been ac
corded a landowner who objected to the amount assessed against
his land as its share of the benefit resulting from the paving of the
street. Local procedure had accorded him the right to file a written
complaint and objection, but not to be heard orally. This Court
held that due process of law required that he "have the right to
support his allegations by argument however brief, and, if need
be, by proof however informal." ... But in the later case of Bi
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, . . . the
Court held that no hearing at all was constitutionally required
prior to a decision by state tax officers in Colorado to increase the
valuation of all taxable property in Denver by a substantial per
centage. The Court distinguished Londoner by stating that there a
small number of persons "exceptionally affected, in each case
upon individual grounds." 37

Adjudicative facts were those relating to the specific assessment
against the plaintiff in Londoner while legislative facts were those
that the state officials took into account in increasing the assessments
generally in Bi-Metallic Investment.
33. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
34. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
35. 3 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at §§ 14.5, 15.4.
36. 410 U.S. 224 (1973).
37. Id. at 244-45.
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Florida East Coast Railway, itself, was an action by certain rail

way companies challenging a rule promulgated by the Interstate
Commerce Commission (ICC) setting incentive per diem rates to
speed the return of extra freight cars and to encourage the purchase
of new ones. 38 The rule was prompted by a chronic freight car
shortage. The existence of the shortage was a legislative fact. Indeed
the shortage was so well known that Congress enacted legislation
giving the ICC authority to set incentive rates. 39 The schedule of per
diem rates was also found by the Supreme Court to be a legislative
fact because it applied to all the railroads, and it denied the railroads
an adjudicative hearing on those facts even though it was claimed
that the burden imposed by ICC's rates would be a greater imposi
tion to some of the railroads than to the others.40
The real focus of Florida East Coast Railway is on the general
applicability of the rates to all railroads. What about an individual
railroad which claims that the rates should not apply to it because of
its peculiar facts? Under the Supreme Court's analysis, it would
seem that the company would be entitled to an adjudicative hearing
on this question. It is in such a case that the distinction between "ac
cusatory" and ''non-accusatory'' cases would arise, for the issue
would not be whether the party has engaged in misconduct but only
whether it is entitled to be treated differently than the other compa
nies. Similarly, a case in which the agency seeks to revoke or modify
a permit for technical reasons and not for any wrongdoing by the
party would also be non-accusatory. The argument is made that in
such cases, notwithstanding the fact that the rights of individual par
ties are being decided, the decision is really based on the determina
tion of legislative facts for which adjudicative proceedings are not
appropriate. 41 Let us examine more closely the merits of this
argument.
Initially it should be noted that an adjudicative hearing on a
waiver from a rule is not concerned with the merits of the rule, but
only with whether its application under a particular set of facts
would be arbitrary. Whether such application would be arbitrary is
determined by the policy served by the rule as set forth in the rule's
statement of basis and purpose. There would be a right to an adjudi
cative hearing only if the facts urged to support the waiver were dis
38. Id.
39. Id. at 225·26.
40. Id. at 225 D.l.
41. Pedersen, JJq1ra Dote 31, at 994-96.
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puted. If the facts urged in support of the waiver were not disputed,
there would be no need for an adjudicative hearing to resolve ques
tions of policy.42 Similar considerations would also apply to persons
who contested their coverage under a rule on the grounds that the
facts with respect to them were completely different from the facts
considered by the agency in promulgating the rule.
The right to an adjudicative hearing on the facts can also differ
depending upon whether or not the agency is the moving party. No
useful purpose would be served by giving a party who applies for a
waiver or permit a hearing on the denial of the application when the
action is based solely upon undisputed facts produced by the appli
cant. On the other hand, when the agency seeks to move against a
party on the basis of facts that it believes justifies the action, the
agency's refusal to accord a party an adjudicative hearing should be
more carefully scrutinized. Without a hearing on the facts a party
may have no real protection against arbitrary or misguided action by
the agency.43 In short, the party that has the burden of producing
evidence to make a primofOcie case (as distinguished from the bur
den of persuasion)44 can be an important factor in determjning the
hearing rights of the parties.
The criticism is directed at the use of adjudicative proceedings
to resolve disputes over difficult technical issues where the data
42. See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192,205 (1956); indus
trial Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 437 F.2d 680, 683 (D.C. Cu. 1970); KCST-TV, Inc. v.
FCC, 699 F.2d 1185, 1191 (D.C. Cu. 1983).
43. Compare Cooper Laboratories v. Comm'r, 501 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1974) wit"
Pactra Indus. v. Products Safety Comm'n., 555 F.2d 677 (9th Cu. 1977). In Cooper Labo
ratories, the a new drug application was summarily rejected without a hearing because of
the applicant's failure to produce substantial evidence showing that the drug was safe
and effective. Under the law the burden was on the new drug applicant to come forward
with such evidence, and the Food '" Drug Administration's authority to require an evi
dentiary showing meeting specific standards in order to be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing on the rejection of an application had been upheld by the Supreme Court. See
Weinberger v. Hynson, Westcott '" Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973) (dealing with the
standards required to show the safety and efficiency of new drugs). In Pactra Industries it
was held that the Consumer Products Safety Commission could not summarily reject
objections to a ban it had issued against the usc of vinyl chloride monomer. The ban had
been based on scientific evidence indicating that the vinyl chloride was a carcinogen. In
this instance the burden was on the CPSC to establish the validity of its ban and the
court held that the agency could not summarily dispose of the case without a hearing
when the scientific evidence was disputed. 555 F.2d at 684-85.
44. On the distinction between the burden of producing evidence and the burden
of persuasion, see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,800-06 (1973); En
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 548 F.2d 999, 1012-18 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 925 (1977).
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available is likely to be incomplete.4s Ideally, such an issue would be
decided by gathering the best qualified experts within the agency
and arriving at a consensus as to what action most closely would
accord with the statutory objectives. The decision thus made would
be an "institutional" one, and not simply the product of one person.
Such a view, however, overlooks the practical way in which an
agency usually works. Usually, the agency action is taken only after
the matter has been investigated and the action recommended by
agency employees. It would be unrealistic to ignore the danger that,
in the process of making the investigation and securing agency ap
proval, those employees to some extent will have become committed
to a position. From the viewpoint of the party who opposes the
agency action, the agency is likely to be regarded as much an adver
sary as if the proceeding were accusatory, especially if the agency
action turns on sharply disputed factual matters. Such a party may
be, for example, one who believes that such action does not ade
quately protect human health or the environment, or who believes
that such action will unnecessarily restrict his freedom to market a
product or to construct a plant. In each of these cases, that the party
has not been charged with wrongdoing may seem minor when com
pared to the consequences of the agency's action to that person's
health or livelihood.
It is, of course, true that the ultimate decision as to which side
the agency takes in a scientific dispute is likely to be more a policy
choice than a factual one, so that it should be judged solely by
whether it is consistent with the statute and reasonable. 46 This, how
ever, should not be a reason for reducing the hearing rights of the
parties with respect to developing the facts and meeting the evidence
opposed to their position. A good example is the case of Seacoast
Anti-Pollution League v. Costle ,47 in which a nuclear-powered elec
trical utility plant applied for a permit to discharge heated water into
the surrounding waters. The issue was not whether heated water is a
pollutant but whether the discharge of heated water in t"is instance
would injure the marine life and biota in the vicinity of the plant.48
The parties opposing the building of the plant in that area were pub
lic interest groups. The Administrator, in deciding that the discharge
45. Pedersen, supra note 31, at 995-96; 2 K.C. DAVIS, supra, note 31, at §§ 12.7,
12.8.
46. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 656
(1980); Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.ld 467, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
47. 572 F.2d 872 (1978).
48. Id. at 874-75.
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would not injure the environment, relied upon the report of a panel
of agency experts which had not been made available to the parties
and contained references to material not in the record. On review,
the court noted that the issues in the case turned upon the credibility
of the experts, who should be subject to cross-examination for a
complete disclosure of the factual grounds for their conclusions. 49
The court also found that the facts upon which the opinions were
based must be facts in the record and not extra-record information
of which the experts had knowledge but which had not been dis
closed to the other parties. '0
The court obviously believed that developing the facts through
adjudicative procedures was important to ensure not only that the
agency had all relevant facts before it, but also that the reviewing
court had a complete record. S 1 Cross-examination of scientists can
not be dismissed as a worthless exercise, for it is a most effective way
of disclosing the factual underpinning of a scientific opinion and the
assumptions that were made in arriving at it.
Professor Davis faults the court for requiring trial-type proce
dures to resolve what he regards as a legislative fact. s2 But the issue
was not the general proposition as to whether heated water was a
pollutant, but the much narrower question of whether the discharges
from that plant would be a pollutant in that particular environmen
tal setting. The public utility was seeking to show why they would
not. Thus, the court's characterization of the factual issues as sharply
49. Id at 875, 881-82.
50. Id at 880, 881-82.
51. The court stated "(i]f determinations such as the one at issue here are not made
on the record, then the fate of the Hampton-Seabrook Estuary could be decided on the
basis of evidence that a court would never see or, what is worse, that a court could not be
sure existed." Id at 877.
52. 2 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at § 12.7. Professor Davis cites the case of Taylor
v. District Engineers, 567 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978), as an example of how Seacoast
should have been decided. It is questionable whether the comparison is an apt one. Tay
lor involved the denial by the Corps of Engineers of a permit to build an access highway
over navigable waters. The statute, 33 U.S.C. §§ 403,406 (1976 &. Supp. v 1981), made
no provision for a hearing before the Corps on the permit, and could be construed as
vesting complete discretion in the Corps subject only to some limited court review to
determine whether the denial of a permit was arbitrary. See Di Vosta Rentals, Inc. v.
Lee, 488 F.2d 674 (5th Cir. 1973), cited by the court in Taylor, 567 F.2d at 1336. In
Seabrook, the statute expressly required a hearing. (The court did not decide whether the
case was brought under 33 U.S.C. § 1326 or § 1342, but both required a public hearing.
See 572 F.2d at 875 n.3.) Review of the administrator's decision was in the court of
appeals on the evidentiary record made before the agency. See 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)
(1976). Thus, the court had ample grounds for ruling that the hearing required was an
adjudicative hearing.
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contested and specific to the parties involved-in short, the typical
kind of adjudicative facts-5eems accurate. S3
Davis and Pederson also argue that, even when the issues are
adjudicative, the separation of functions should be dispensed with
because it precludes the agency from taking advantage of its institu
tional expertise. 54 Since that expertise most likely had input into the
agency's position previously, it means either that those who were re
sponsible for formulating the agency's position initially will be
judges on the merits of the dispute or the matter will be reviewed by
some other agency employee. How neutral a reviewing employee
may be depends upon the internal organization of the agency and
the relationship between the employees within the agency. For ex
ample, if the reviewing employee served under the same supervisor
who took part in deciding the agency's initial position, the reviewing
employee might be reluctant to take a position which would contlict
with that supervisor. Further, the reviewing employee might be re
luctant to overrule the original employees who participated in the
initial policy decision, if by doing so the reviewing employee may
meet with hostility. This will be true particularly if they meet on a
daily basis or if they are working together on other matters. It goes
without saying, of course, that the administrative law judge is not
subject to any such pressures.
Another objection to adjudicative hearings is that they are ex
pensive and time-consuming. ss It is questionable, however, whether
informal proceedings would be any less expensive. Such proceedings
53. See 572 F.2d at 876.
54. Pedersen, supra note 31, at 996-97, 1008-09,3 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at
§ 17.15.
55. Pedersen directs his objection to the expense incurred by having specialized
hearing officers, and concedes that the delay caused by having adjudicative hearings is
relatively minor. Pederson, supra note 31, at 1008-10. One solution to the expense of each
agency having its own administrative law judges is to establish a separate corps of ad
ministrative law judges such as is proposed by S. 1275, 98th Congo 1st Sess. (1983). Pro
fessor Davis also objects to the separation of functions as an inefficient usc of agency
employees but also considers hearings permitting the usc of cross-examination to be an
unncccssarily expensive way to try legislative facts. 2 K.C. DAVIS, supra note 31, at § 12.8
at 441. As to factual questions such as the existence of a freight car shortage, this may be
true. The difficulty with the analysis, which the author hopes is made clear by this article,
is that the line between what facts are "adjudicative" and what are "legislative" is not
always clear-cut. Insofar as the relative expense of adjudicative versus less formal proce
dures is a factor in determining the hearing rights of the partics, it is to be noted that the
Supreme Court has approached the question of a party's hearing rights in Social Security
disability payment cases by balancing the cost to the Government against the benefits to
the other side. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also, Friendly, Some
Kind 0/ a Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267 (1975).
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involve not only presenting written submissions but also the oppor
tunity to orally comment on the agency action which is often permit
ted if the agency believes the case is important or of special interest
to the public. In fact, the only substantial additional expense created
by an adjudicatory hearing before an administrative law judge is the
expense of bringing witnesses to the place of hearing and making
them available for cross-examination. To say that cross-examination
is likely to be unproductive really reflects an unnecessarily skeptical
attitude toward finding the truth in scientific controversies. S6 The
validity of scientific opinions rests upon the soundness of deductions
drawn from empirical data, a full disclosure of the facts relied upon
and the reasoning behind the expert conclusions. Such inquiry can
only aid the agency in reaching an informed opinion about the rela
tive merits of each side. In short, while an agency should be given a
good deal of latitude in deciding policy, this should not be a grounds
for weakening the fact-finding process by reducing the availability of
cross-examination.
Finally, the argument is made that, if cross-examination is nec
essary to develop the record, this can be done more efficiently by a
panel of experts presiding as an inquisitorial board than can be ac
complished by lawyers conducting cross-examination before another
lawyer who is presiding as an administrative law judge. s7 If expertise
is required on the part of the presiding officer, an answer would be to
have administrative law judges, who are either expert in the regu
latory fields in which the agencies are involved or who could call
upon expert advice for assistance. Certainly, no one Can quarrel with
permitting administrative law judges to use expert advice, provided
it does not compromise their independence. Whether the administra
tive law judge should be an expert in the regulatory field is a differ
ent question; all that need be said is that the importance of expertise
on the part of the presiding officer may be overemphasized. It is rare
that the resolution of a scientific dispute involves matters so arcane
that they cannot be explained in terms comprehensible to a layman
of ordinary intelligence. Indeed, it is a useful exercise to require that
they be explained for it will not only aid the reviewing court whose
members may not have expert knowledge in the field, but it may also
eliminate reliance on technical jargon and help them reach a clearer
understanding of the issues.
56. This seems to be the real import of Pedersen's comment that when the facts are
difficult to ascertain, decisions are dictated by policy rather than by the facts. See Peder
sen supra note 31, at 1012.
57. Pedersen, supra note 31, at 1019, 1032-33.
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CONCLUSION

The administrative agency with its combination of
prosecutorial, legislative and adjudicative functions presently has a
good deal of flexibility in the way it carries out its mission. But the
agency can only be effective if the public has confidence in the pro
cess, a confidence created by the conviction that they have been
treated fairly and that the outcome is reasonable, even though they
may be unhappy about the ultimate judgment. The administrative
law judge helps to preserve the proper balance between the
prosecutorial, adjudicative and legislative functions of the agency. If
the agency, in its zeal to be more efficient, overrides adjudicative
safeguards in favor of strengthening its prosecutorial or legislative
functions, the courts may well feel the need to restore the balance by
exercising greater judicial oversight, with the net result being to sim
ply transfer the cost of litigation from the agencies to the courts. It is
also possible that Congress may be persuaded by public opinion to
restrain the agency's powers.

